We define several security properties for the analysis of probabilistic non-interference as a conservative extension of the nondeterministic approach by Focardi and Gorrieri 
Introduction
The analysis of information flow among different components of a concurrent computer system is a well established approach used for verifying the non-occurrence of unauthorized disclosure of confidential information (see, e.g., [7, 4, 28, 25] ). Among the different proposals which address such an analysis, we consider the notion of non-interference [28] that expresses the privacy property of systems. The central idea of non-interference is that a program is secure whenever the variation of the confidential data does not affect the program behavior as observed by the attacker, usually represented by the public data and applications of the system. Several information flow security properties have been proposed to formalize the idea of noninterference based on different system models (see, e.g., [51, 37, 29] ) and here we concentrate on the use of process algebras (see, e.g., [34, 43, 42, 20, 40, 44] ). Most of such process algebraic approaches address the problem of defining and analyzing information flow in a nondeterministic setting. In particular, in this paper we consider the nondeterministic approach by Focardi and Gorrieri [20] and their classification of a set of security properties capturing the idea of information flow and non-interference [22] . In short, they employ an extension of CCS [39] , where events are partitioned into two different levels of confidentiality (low level and high level), thus allowing the information flowing between the two different levels to be modeled and controlled. As an example, the most interesting and intuitive security property which they advocate is the Non Deducibility on Compositions (AE , for short), which can be informally described as follows:
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where is the model of the system to be considered, stands for the parallel composition operator, is the equivalence relation on the behavior as observed by low users. The above formula says that system is AE secure if, from the low level user standpoint, the behavior of the system is invariant with respect to the composition with any high level user ¥.
Security definitions, like the AE , based on pure nondeterminism are used to reveal undesirable, logical information flows. However, in many cases the observable behavior of the system should take into consideration additional aspects, such as probabilities, in order to check the existence of, e.g., probabilistic covert channels that otherwise do not arise when considering the nondeterministic behavior only. Another reason for considering probabilities is that a probabilistic approach permits to overcome the classical, qualitative, binary view according to which high information is (is not) leaked to low level users. In particular, by giving a probabilistic measure to each unwanted information flow, the modeler can estimate the level of security of the system. In practice, a low level user may check if the probability of observing an undesirable information flow is beyond a threshold for which he considers the system to be secure "enough". Moreover, when the system model is equipped with probabilistic information, the modeler can describe in the same specification different aspects of the behavior of the system and, e.g., analyze on the same model information flow security properties as well as derive performance related measures. In this paper, we apply the approach to information flow theory of [20] to a nondeterministic process algebra and, in the context of a probabilistic extension of such a calculus, we propose a natural, conservative, probabilistic extension of the security properties described in [20] . With respect to [20, 21, 22] , which are based on a CCS-like process algebra, in the framework of our probabilistic approach we resort to a CSP-like calculus [2] , that is particularly adequate to combine powerful mechanisms like probabilistic external/internal choices, multiway synchronization, and asynchronous execution of parallel processes, that are suitable to describe the probabilistic behavior of real systems (as emphasized, e.g., in [1] ). The extension we propose is conservative in the sense that by removing probabilistic information from a system È of our probabilistic calculus we obtain the nondeterministic variant È Ò of È , on which the approach to information flow theory based on nondeterminism of [20] may be applied by obtaining results which are fully consistent with those related to the security analysis of È . In particular, if È satisfies a given security property Ë in our probabilistic framework, then È Ò satisfies the corresponding nondeterministic property Ë Ò and, more in general, in the probabilistic setting we have the same inclusion relationships among security properties as in the nondeterministic setting. Therefore, as we will show through several examples, our probabilistic security properties capture both unwanted information flows which are observable by considering the logical, possible behaviors of the system and information leakage due to the probabilistic behavior of the system only. Moreover, we show how probabilities can be exploited to achieve additional information related to the information flowing through the system, like, e.g., the level of security of the system in the sense we specified above.
Finally, all the main features of our probabilistic approach are emphasized in a case study. More precisely, we model the algebraic specification of a router working at the network layer and implementing a probabilistic routing mechanism that handles both confidential and public data. With these assumptions in view, we analyze different versions of such a system that may reveal potential possibilistic and probabilistic information flows from high level to low level.
Related Work
A significant amount of work has been done in order to extend the relation among potential information flows and different aspects of concurrent systems such as time and probabilities. As an example, programs which execute several concurrent processes introduce the potential for a malicious party to observe the internal timing behaviors of programs, via the effect that the running time of commands might have on the scheduler choice of whenever various concurrent alternatives can be executed (see, e.g., [23, 19, 48] ). On the other hand, real systems may exhibit probabilistic covert channels that are not ruled out by standard nondeterministic security models [29, 51] . In particular, Gray [29] proposes in the context of a probabilistic version of Millen's synchronous state machine [38] two definitions of security:´ µ the Probabilistic Non-interference (ÈAEÁ ), which intuitively says that different behaviors of the high part of the environment do not affect the probability distribution of the low events (such an intuition, as we will see, will be rephrased in our process algebraic setting);´ µ the Applied Flow Model ( Å ), which is an interpretation of the Flow Model of [37] , saying that the probability of a low output may depend on previous low events, but not on previous high events. Gray proves that Å is stronger than ÈAEÁ (similarly, we will present a notion of security stronger than our definition of ÈAEÁ ). Moreover, Jürjens [35] considers the notion of ÈAEÁ of [29] in the setting of a model of probabilistic dataflow, by showing the compositionality of ÈAEÁ in such a context and that a simpler nonprobabilistic notion of non-interference, called Nondeducibility on Strategies [51] , is an instantiation of ÈAEÁ .
Additionally, Sabelfeld and Sands [46] say that "since a scheduler's behavior might be probabilistic, this opens up an opportunity for the attacker to set up a probabilistic covert channel whereby information is obtained by statistical inferences drawn from the relative frequency of outcomes of a repeated computation". Therefore, they formalize the idea of confidentiality for a simple imperative language with dynamic thread creation. More precisely, they develop extensional semantics based specifications of secure information flow for multi-threaded programs. Such specifications capture probabilistic information flows that arise from the scheduling of concurrent threads. The novelty of their approach is the adoption of a probabilistic notion of bisimulation in formalizing security conditions (as previously done in [20] in a nondeterministic setting). A definition of probabilistic weak bisimulation (see, e.g., [6] ) is also employed in [49] to justify the correctness of a type system for secure information flow. In the same line of the above discussion, [14] resorts to a possibilistic information flow analysis of a Probabilistic Idealised Algol to check for probabilistic interference, whereas in [16, 17] a probabilistic security analysis is proposed in the framework of a declarative programming language. Finally, [30] sets out a modal logic for reasoning about multilevel security of probabilistic systems.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no approach has been proposed for the definition of the information flow theory in the context of a probabilistic process algebra. We think that the definition and the analysis of information flow security properties for concurrent systems could benefit by the well-established support given by the known results and formal techniques developed in (probabilistic) process algebras that, as the literature has shown in the nondeterministic case (see, e.g., [40, 21, 44] ), offer the adequate tool for a clean and rigorous formalization of a generalized notion of security.
Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start by introducing a simple nondeterministic process algebra and by providing as a background the definition of three security properties in the same line of the nondeterministic approach of [20] (Sect. 2). Then, we present the probabilistic calculus [2, 8] , that is an extension of the nondeterministic one of Sect. 2 obtained by adding probabilistic parameters to the algebraic operators. In particular, we define the syntax, the semantics and the labeled transition systems associated to terms of the probabilistic process algebra (Sect. 3). As far as the equivalence relation we adopt is concerned, we resort to a probabilistic variant of the weak bisimulation (Sect. 4), the main reason being that weak bisimulation has been proved to be particularly suitable to deal with some kind of information flow for nondeterministic processes [20, 21] . Based on such a notion of equivalence, we define the probabilistic version of properties like the Bisimulation AE of [21] , and we compare such properties with some well-known security properties proposed in the literature, such as Strong AE [20] and local non-interference [26] (Sect. 5). In the same section, we discuss some further aspect concerning the relationship between security property analysis and probabilistic behavior of the system. Finally, we present the case study on probabilistic routing and we analyze the potential information flows from high level to low level that may be revealed by different versions of the same system (Sect. 6). Some conclusions terminate the paper (Sect. 7).
Classical Security Properties based on Nondeterminism
The security definitions inspired to the non-interference idea which we consider in this paper are based on a CSP-like process algebra and follow the nondeterministic approach of [22] . In this section, we rephrase the nondeterministic approach to information flow theory of [20, 21, 22] , which employ a CCS-like calculus, in the context of our nondeterministic CSP-like process algebra.
A Nondeterministic Calculus
In our nondeterministic calculus, actions are explicitly partitioned into output actions and input actions and a multiway cooperation discipline is applied in order to allow synchronizations involving (at most) one output action and (possibly several) input actions to be performed. As we will see, these features simplify the definition of the probabilistic model when extending the nondeterministic process algebra with probabilities. As usual in security models, we distinguish between high level visible actions and low level visible actions in order to allow the analysis of the information flow between parties with different levels of confidentiality to be performed.
Formally, we denote the set of action types by ÌÝÔ , ranged over by . Let ÓÒ×Ø be a set of constants, ranged over by . The set Ä Ò of process terms of our calculus is ranged over by È Ò É Ò (when it is clear from the context we omit the subscript Ò ) and is generated by the syntax:
As far as an informal intuition of the operators is concerned, ¼ represents the terminated or deadlocked term, È is the classical prefix operator, È · É is a CCS-like alternative composition operator expressing a nondeterministic choice between È and É, and È Ë É is a CSP-like parallel composition operator, where processes È and É:
¯locally execute their input and output actions of type ¾ Ë; are required to synchronize over visible actions of the same type ¾ Ë. In particular, a synchronization between two actions of type ¾ Ë may occur only if either they are both input actions £ (and the result is an input action £ ), or one of them is an output action and the other one is an input action £ (and the result is an output action ).
Hence, our parallel operator allows multiway synchronizations composed by all input actions except at most one output action to be performed. In particular, the synchronization policy we consider is asymmetric, in that by following a so-called master-salve cooperation discipline a process can broadcast a given output action , while each of the other processes reacts by synchronizing through an input action £ [8, 10] . Moreover, we point out that the CSP-like parallel operator can be used to express the restriction of actions. In particular, È Ä ¼ represents a system executing the local actions which the lefthand process È can perform except for the actions whose type belongs to the synchronization set Ä, which are not allowed to synchronize because the righthand process is the null term ¼. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity we use the abbreviation È ÒÄ, denoting a system È which prevents the execution of the actions belonging to the type set Ä, to stand for the expression È Ä ¼. The formal semantics of our nondeterministic process algebra is given by the labeled transition system´Ä Ò Ø µ, whose states are terms of the process algebra and the transition relation Ä Ò ¢ Ø ¢ Ä Ò is the minimal relation satisfying the operational rules reported in Table 1 .
In order to define security properties in the context of our calculus, we need a notion of equivalence relation. In this paper, we just consider the properties based on the weak bisimulation equivalence [39] . As shown in [21] , the reason for this stems from some lacks typical of other notions of equivalence, such as the trace equivalence. The notion of bisimulation is finer than trace equivalence and is able to detect a higher number of information flows (e.g. trace equivalence is not able to detect high level deadlocks). Moreover, as far as other notions of equivalence are concerned, [21] shows that failure/testing equivalences are not adequate for systems with some high level loops or with loops.
In the following, given We now report the classical definition of weak bisimulation over terms of our nondeterministic calculus. 
Definition 2.1 An equivalence relation
Two terms È É ¾ Ò are weakly bisimulation equivalent, denoted È É, if there exists a weak bisimulation Ê containing the pair´È Éµ.
Finally, we use the expression È ×Ó É to say that È and É are isomorphic, i.e. the labeled transition systems derived from È and É are structurally equal (there exists a bijection between the two state spaces such that any pair of corresponding states have identically labeled transitions toward any pair of corresponding states).
Analyzing Nondeterministic Security Properties
Based on the above nondeterministic process algebra and the related notion of equivalence, we now define three security properties. We start with the Strong Nondeterministic Non-interference (ËAEAEÁ ) [20] , which informally says that a system is secure if what the low level part can see does
not depend on what the high level part can do. Here, we define the ËAEAEÁ property based on the weak bisimulation equivalence and we call it Bisimulation Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference ( ËAEAEÁ ). In our process algebraic framework it may be expressed as follows.
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Definition 2.2 È ¾ Ò is ËAEAEÁ secure if and only if
In the above definition È ÌÝÔ À represents a system where the high level actions are hidden, while È Ò ÌÝÔ À represents a system where the execution of the high level actions is prevented. Therefore, if a system È satisfies the ËAEAEÁ property then, from the low level user viewpoint, the following condition is preserved: for each behavior in È Ò ÌÝÔ À which is observable whenever the high level user does not interact with the system, we have an equivalent behavior in È ÌÝÔ À which is observable whenever the high level user performs actions not visible by the low view, and viceversa. In essence, a low level user cannot infer, by observing the low view of the system, that some high level activity has occurred. Example 2.3 Let us consider the system È ¡ Ð ¼ · Ð ¼ ¼ that, from the low level standpoint, nondeterministically performs either an action Ð or an action Ð ¼ if the high level output has previously occurred. When analyzing the security properties of È , we make the following assumptions. Since we employ a calculus where communications are synchronous, system È interacts with the external environment by offering high (low) outputs which have to be accepted by the high (low) level user and by accepting high (low) inputs which come from the high (low) level user. For instance, in the initial state of our example, system È can either execute the output action Ð if the low level user is available to accept it, or execute the output action if the high level user is available to accept it. Hence, we check if the interplay between the high level user and the high part of the system can affect the view of the system as observed by a low level user. Then, we also assume that the low level user knows how the system È is defined, and we check if, in spite of this, he is not able to infer the behavior of the high level user by observing the low view of the system at run time. With these assumptions in view, we can verify that È is clearly not secure, because depending on which output action between Ð and Ð ¼ is executed by the system, a low level user can infer that the high level user has (has not) accepted the output action .
Formally, we have that
Another example of an unwanted information flow is given by the system È ¡ Ð È · ¼, where a possible deadlock can be caused by the execution of the high level action . Aware of such a potential behavior, a low level user knows that no high level action has been performed each time he observes a low level action Ð. This is more than enough to set up an information flow from high level to low level. Formally, we have that È ÌÝÔ À ×Ó Ð È · ¼ Ð È ×Ó È Ò ÌÝÔ À . Note that the same system turns out to be ËAEAEÁ secure if the equivalence relation we employ is the classical trace equivalence that, hence, is not adequate to reveal high level deadlocks.
Finally, an example of a system which is ËAEAEÁ secure is given by È ¡ Ð È · Ð È . Indeed, the low level view of such a system consists of the repeated execution of action Ð, that is not enough to infer anything about the high level behavior. Formally, we have that
Other properties have been suggested in the literature in order to capture different behaviors of the system that have to be considered insecure. For instance, as already seen in the introduction, one of the most established security properties is the Non Deducibility on Composition, which says that the low view of a system È in isolation is not to be altered when considering each potential interaction of È with the high level users of the external environment. Here, we consider a notion of the AE property based on the bisimulation equivalence, called Bisimulation AE ( AE ). A formalization of such a property in the context of our calculus may be as follows. 
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Because of the presence of the universal quantification on all possible high level processes, the AE property could be difficult to be used in practice. Therefore, stronger formulations of such a property have been proposed that avoid the adoption of universal quantification on all possible high level processes and reveal additional potential information flows that some authors in the literature consider to be insecure. Here, we decide to consider the Strong AE (Ë AE ), introduced in [20] , that does not involve composition with each possible high level process ¥ and is the strongest security property defined by the authors of [20] . In [26, 41] the same property under the name of strong local non-interference (ËÄAEÁ ) has been proposed for the analysis of noninterference in the context of CSP [32] . Like the AE property, the Ë AE checks the condition which says that whatever the high level part does, the set of nondeterministic behaviors which are observable by the low level user should not change. Moreover, as a stricter requirement, it also checks the condition which says that whenever the low level user observes the system behavior, he should not distinguish which, if any, high level event has occurred at some point in the past. We will clarify the difference between such requirements through some example. The formal definition of the Ë AE property in the context of our calculus is as follows.
Definition 2.6 È ¾ Ò is Ë AE secure if and only if
With respect to the definition of AE , where we have to check the property for an infinite set of terms, i.e. ¥ ¾ À Ò , the condition needed by the Ë AE requires to check a finite number of terms, i.e. each È ¼ ¾ Ö´Èµ, whenever È is associated to a finite state transition system. Example 2.7 Let us consider the system È ¡ ´ ¼ · Ð ¼µ · Ð ¼ from which the labeled transition system of Fig. 1(a) 
Intuitively, it can be debatable whether we should classify È as an insecure system. For instance, one may argue for this being an information flow because, once the internal nondeterminism is resolved, the system can evolve into a state where a high level user can block (or delay) the execution of the low level action Ð, thus creating a covert channel. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the high level part has no control over the resolution of the nondeterminism in term È .
Example 2.8
As another example, let us consider the system É ¡ Ð ¼ · Ð ¼ · Ð ¼ ¼ whose corresponding labeled transition system is shown in Fig. 1 
and it is provable that É is AE secure too. In particular, for any high level user which interacts with É by accepting the high level output , the low view of the system consists of a nondeterministic choice between Ð ¼ and an internal action which leads to the execution of action Ð. On the other hand, for any high level user which does not allow the output action to be executed, the low view of the system still remains the same. However, we cannot consider É as a secure system, because a low level user which observes the action Ð ¼ can deduce that the high level user has not performed the action . In other words, the low view of the system reveals the past behavior of the high level user. Such an information flow is captured by the Ë AE property. Formally, the execution of the high level action leads from
Example 2.9 As a final example, which has been proposed in [41] , let us consider the following
where the high level environment repeatedly communicates a value (¼ or ½) to the low level part amongst randomly created noise (see the underlying labeled transition system in Fig. 1(c) ). One can believe that Ê has no information flow if we consider the possible behaviors of the system only. Indeed Ê is both ËAEAEÁ (ÊÒ ÌÝÔ À Ð ¼ Ê · Ð ½ Ê Ê ÌÝÔ À ) and, as it is easy to see, AE secure. Anyway, each time the
is executed a low level user infers that the high level input ½£ ( ¼£ ) has not taken place. Moreover, in [41] it is suggested that the low level user should be able to infer the high behavior whenever the high level user always offers the input ¼£ with respect to the input ½£ .
Formally, the system Ê does not satisfy the Ë AE property. For instance, Ê can execute the high level action ¼£ thus reaching the state Figure 1 . Examples of systems that are AE secure, but not Ë AE secure
We conclude this introductory section by observing that the inclusion relationships for the bisimulation-based security properties depicted in Fig. 2 
We now prove that, if È is Ë AE , then Ê È ¥ Ë is a bisimulation up to [47] . By inspection of possible cases, it follows: We also observe that since È ¼ Ò ÌÝÔ À ´´È ¼ Ë ¥µ ËµÒ ÌÝÔ À µ for all È ¼ ¾ Ö´Èµ, then È ¼ is AE (and also ËAEAEÁ), which is a condition stricter than that we wanted to prove. Finally, the counterexamples given in Examples 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 prove that the inclusion above is strict.
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Figure 2. Inclusion relationship among nondeterministic properties
From the proof of Proposition 2.10 we derive an alternative definition for the AE property, as specified in the following lemma. In this section we have proposed the nondeterministic non-interference property, which is the interpretation in a process algebraic setting of the non-interference notion of [28] , the nondeducibility on composition property, which we consider the most intuitive and interesting property proposed in [20] , and the strong version of such a property, introduced in [20] , which turns out to be the strongest security property defined so far. We conclude by observing that many other properties exist and they all can be rephrased in our nondeterministic process algebra by preserving the inclusion relationship shown in [20, 22] .
A Probabilistic Calculus
In this section we consider a probabilistic extension of the nondeterministic calculus of Sect. 2.1 that is a slight variant of the process algebra proposed in [2, 8] . As we will see, the most natural and intuitive way to define such an extension consists of: 1. adding probabilistic information to the algebraic operators; 2. adopting a model of probabilities, that turns out to be a mixture of the classical generative and reactive models of [27] . In particular, we assume that output actions behave as generative actions: a process which behaves generatively autonomously decides, on the basis of a probability distribution, which action will be performed. Moreover, we assume that input actions behave as reactive actions: a process which behaves reactively just reacts internally to the action chosen by a generative component of its environment (say ) on the basis of a probability distribution associated with the reactive actions of type it can perform. Therefore, since the choice of the action type is completely nondeterministic, as it depends on the environment, we see the reactive actions as incomplete actions that must synchronize with generative actions of another system component in order to form a closed system (i.e. a system not including nondeterministic choices that have to be resolved by the environment). Then, a system is considered to be fully specified when it gives rise to a probabilistic transition system that is purely generative, in the sense that it executes complete actions only. A fully specified system is therefore a fully probabilistic system from which a Markov Chain, which can be analyzed to get performance measures of the system, can be easily derived by discarding actions from transition labels.
In the remainder of the section, we first describe the models, called generative-reactive transition systems, associated to terms of the probabilistic calculus by the operational semantics, and then we extend the syntax and semantics of the basic nondeterministic calculus with probabilistic information. Finally, we equip the probabilistic calculus with a probabilistic weak bisimulation equivalence in the line of [6] .
Generative-reactive Transition Systems
Generative-reactive transition systems [2, 8] are composed of transitions labeled with an action, which can be either output or input, and a probability. According to our choice of considering input actions as reactive actions and output actions as generative actions, we denote the set of reactive actions by Ê Ø Á and the set of generative actions by Ø Ç
. Note that the action is generative, because it expresses an internal move autonomously executed by the process without interactions with the environment. Moreover, it turns out that Ø Ê Ø Ø.
Transitions leaving a state are grouped into several bundles. We have a single generative bundle composed of all the transitions labeled with a generative action, and several reactive bundles, each one referring to a different action type and composed of all the transitions labeled with £ . A bundle of transitions expresses a probabilistic choice. On the contrary, the choice among bundles is performed non-deterministically. Definition 3.1 A generative-reactive transition system ( ÊÌË) is a triple´Ë ÌÝÔ Ì µ where Ë is a set of states, ÌÝÔ is a set of action types, and Ì ¾ Å´Ë ¢ Ø ¢ ℄¼ ½℄ ¢ Ëµ is a multiset ¾ of ¾. We use " " and " " as brackets for multisets and Å´Ëµ to denote the collection of multisets over set Ë.
probabilistic transitions, such that
The requirement ½ defines the reactive bundles (one for each action type), and the requirement ¾ defines the unique generative bundle. Both requirements say that for each state the probabilities of the transitions composing a bundle, if there are any, sum up to 1 (otherwise the summation over empty multisets is defined equal to 0). As an example, in Fig. 3 we show a ÊÌË composed of a generative bundle enabling three transitions , , and , a reactive bundle of type enabling two transitions £ , and a reactive bundle of type enabling a single transition £ . Graphically, transitions of the same bundle are grouped by an arc, and the probability of a transition is omitted when equal to 1. We point out that a fully specified system (i.e. a system that does not include reactive bundles) is performance closed, in the sense that it gives rise to a fully probabilistic transition system that does not include nondeterministic choices.
Figure 3. Example of a generative-reactive transition system
Finally, it is easy to see that from a generative-reactive transition system we can derive a labeled transition system´Ä Ò Ø µ as those described in Sect. 2.1 by simply removing the probabilities from the labels of the transitions.
Syntax and Informal Semantics
In this section we present the syntax and the informal semantics of our probabilistic calculus that is a smooth variant of that proposed in [2, 8] , in the sense that here we do not consider a relabeling operator, but we introduce a hiding operator. The set Ä of process terms, ranged over
, is generated by the syntax:
where Ë ÌÝÔ , ¾ ÌÝÔ , and Ô ¾℄¼ ½ . We denote by the set of guarded and closed terms (i.e. the set of processes of Ä) and by À È ¾ ×ÓÖØ´Èµ ÌÝÔ À the set of high level processes, i.e. including high level actions only.
An informal overview of the operators is very similar to that given in Sect. 2.1, except for the fact that here we have probabilistic parameters attached to the operators that we employ to resolve the choices in each process term. Indeed, it is worth noting that from any term È ¾ Ä we can derive a corresponding term È Ò ¾ Ä Ò by removing the probabilistic parameters from the operators in È . As an example, process È ¡ Ð ¼ · Ô Ð ¼ is a term of our probabilistic calculus and its nondeterministic counterpart is process È Ò of Example 2.5. Now, we show the intuitive meaning of each operator.
¼ represents a terminated or deadlocked term having no transitions.
The prefix operator È performs the action with probability 1 and then behaves like È . ¿
The alternative composition operator È · Ô É expresses a probabilistic choice between the generative actions of È and É and between the reactive actions of È and É of the same type. In particular, we have the following cases:
¿. Usually, we abbreviate terms ¼ by omitting the final ¼.
1. if both È and É can execute generative actions, then È · Ô É chooses a generative action of È with probability Ô and a generative action of É with probability ½ Ô. See, e.g., Fig. 4(a) ; 2. if one process È or É cannot execute generative actions, È · Ô É chooses a generative action of the other process with probability 1 (similarly as in [5] );
3. as far as reactive actions of a given type are concerned, È · Ô É chooses between the reactive actions £ of È and É according to probability Ô, by following the same mechanism seen for generative actions. See, e.g., Fig. 4(b) ; 4. the choice among generative and reactive actions or among reactive actions of different types is just nondeterministic. See, e.g., Fig. 4 (c) which shows purely nondeterministic choices and Fig. 4(d) which shows a mixed nondeterministic/probabilistic choice.
Figure 4. Examples of ÊÌËs derived from alternative composition
The parallel composition operator È Ô Ë É performs the actions of its components È and É by following the synchronization policy described in Sect. 2.1 and, for the actions of È and É not in Ë, the same probabilistic mechanism seen for alternative composition. Moreover, it follows these additional rules: 1. since the execution of some generative action of È (É) can be prevented in È Ô Ë É, the probabilities of executing the remaining generative actions of È (É) are proportionally redistributed so that their overall probability sums up to 1 (as standard when restricting actions in the generative model [27] ); 2. in the case of synchronizing generative actions of È (É), their probability is distributed among the multiple actions obtained by synchronizing with reactive actions £ executable by É (È ), according to the probability the actions £ are chosen in É (È );
3. in the case of synchronizing reactive actions of a given type ¾ Ë, if both È and É can execute some action £ , the choice of the two actions £ of È and É forming the actions £ executable by È Ô Ë É is made according to the probability they are independently chosen by È and É. Fig. 5(a) we report the ÊÌË derived from the term´´ · Õ µ · Õ ¼ £ µ Ô that may execute the two non-synchronizing generative actions and of the lefthand process and the synchronizing generative action of the righthand process (note that the execution of is allowed by the reactive action £ of the lefthand process). As in the case of alternative composition, since both processes may execute some generative actions, we perform a generative action of the lefthand process with probability Ô and a generative action of the righthand process with probability ½ Ô. Since the generative actions executable by´ · Õ µ· Õ ¼ £ are with probability Õ and with probability ½ Õ, the composed system executes action with probability Ô ¡ Õ, action with probability Ô ¡´½ Õµ and action with probability ½ Ô. As another example, in Fig. 5(b) we show the ÊÌË derived from term´ · Ö µ Ô ´ £ · Õ £ µ, where only the lefthand process may execute some generative action (hence parameter Ô is not considered). In particular, since the righthand process does not allow the action to synchronize, we execute only the generative action with probability ½ (hence parameter Ö is not considered). Such an action synchronizes with one of the two reactive actions £ of the righthand process chosen according to probability Õ. Therefore, we execute the action leading to ¼ Ô with probability Õ and the action leading to ¼ Ô with probability
Example 3.2 In
½ Õ. a, c, b, b, d c pq 1−p b, p(1−q) q 1−q (a) (b)
Figure 5. Examples of ÊÌËs derived from parallel composition
The hiding operator È Ô turns generative and reactive actions of type into generative actions , by changing the probabilities according to these rules: -as far as generative actions executable by È Ô are concerned, we distinguish the following cases:
1. if È enables both some generative action and some reactive action £ , then È Ô chooses a generative action (obtained by hiding an action £ of È ) with probability Ô and a generative action previously enabled in È with probability ½ Ô. The semantics of È Ô ×Ó · Ô´ · Õ µ, where the action of type of È is turned into a action, is a probabilistic choice between , executed with probability Ô, and the actions and , executed with probability´½ Ôµ¡Õ and´½ Ôµ¡´½ Õµ, respectively. Hence, parameter Ô expresses the probability that action obtained by hiding the reactive action £ of È is executed with respect to the generative actions previously enabled by È .
The reason for turning reactive actions £ into generative internal actions depends on the fact that one of the goals of the hiding operator consists of obtaining fully specified systems from open systems (i.e. systems enabling reactive choices). In particular, when a system is fully specified, the nondeterministic choices due to the possible interactions with the environment have to be resolved, and parameter Ô turns such choices into probabilistic choices. Formally, the effect of hiding the reactive action £ in process È corresponds to the execution of a synchronization between £ and an external generative action that gives rise to an internal action whose probability distribution depends on parameter Ô. When analyzing security properties which employ the hiding operator, we will show that the low behavior of a secure system does not depend on the choice of parameter Ô. Constants are used to specify recursive systems. When defining an algebraic specification, we assume a set of constants defining equations of the form ¡ È (with È a guarded term) to be given. For the sake of simplicity, we assume: the parameter Ô to be equal to ½ ¾ whenever it is omitted from any probabilistic operator; the synchronization set Ë to be the empty set whenever it is omitted from the parallel operator;
¯the In particular, it is easy to see that the presence of the probabilistic parameter in the parallel operator is not meaningful
In order to avoid ambiguities, we introduce the following operator precedence relation: prefix restriction hiding alternative composition parallel composition. We conclude the presentation of the syntax by pointing out that parameter Ô of the probabilistic operators cannot be equal to the limiting values ¼ and ½, because in our calculus a probabilistic choice does not exclude the execution of a possible behavior of the system.
Operational Semantics
The formal semantics of our probabilistic process algebra is given by the generative-reactive transition system´ ÌÝÔ Ì µ, whose states are terms of the calculus and the transition relation Ì is the least multiset satisfying the operational rules reported in Table 2 (containing the operational rules for the basic language) and in Table 3 (containing the additional rules for the hiding operator), where in addition to rules undersigned with Ð, which refer to the local moves of the lefthand process È , we also consider the symmetrical rules (undersigned with Ö) taking into account the local moves of the righthand process É, obtained by exchanging the roles of terms È and É in the premises and by replacing Ô with ½ Ô in the label of the derived transitions. , meaning that È can execute a generative action of a type belonging to set .
Here, we detail rules´ ¿µ to´ µ, which are concerned with generative transitions executable by È Ô Ë É, while it is easy to see that all the other rules reflect the informal description of the operators given in Sect. 3.2.
Since we consider a restricted set of executable actions, like in [27] we redistribute the probabilities of the generative transitions of È executable by È Ô Ë É so that their overall probability sums up to 1 (we can symmetrically argue in the case of É). To this aim, in semantics rules we As shown in [2, 8] we have that the operational semantics of a process È ¾ is a ÊÌË. 
Equivalence
In this section we define the probabilistic weak bisimulation equivalence, proposed in [6] , in the context of generative-reactive transition systems. The basic idea consists of replacing the classical weak transitions × µ × ¼ used in Definition 2.1 by the probability to reach the class of states equivalent to × ¼ from × via a sequence of transitions labeled with strings in £ £ . Before introducing such a notion of equivalence, we recall some basic notation related to probability theory (see, e.g., [31] ). Probability theory begins with the concept of probability space, which is a triple´ª ¼ where ÔÖ ¬Ü is the usual prefix relation on sequences. Now, given an initial state × ¾ Ë, we define a probability space on the executions which start in ×. Let Ü ´×µ be the set of executions starting in × and Ü Ö ´×µ be the set of execution fragments starting in ×. We denote by ¦´×µ the smallest sigma field on Ü ´×µ which contains all where ¾ Ü Ö ´×µ. The probability measure ÈÖÓ is the unique measure on ¦´×µ such that ÈÖÓ ´ µ ÈÖ´ µ. The definition of probabilistic weak bisimulation for ÊÌËs derives from the definition of probabilistic weak bisimulation for fully probabilistic systems of [6] , where the weak transition relation µ of Milner [39] is replaced by the probability ÈÖÓ ´È £ µ. It is worth noting that the authors of [6] define both weak and delay bisimulation for fully probabilistic transition systems and show that these two relations coincide in the probabilistic setting (hence we can use £ instead of £ £ in the following definition). We point out that [6] describes an algorithm that computes probabilistic weak bisimulation equivalence classes in time Ç´Ò ¿ µ and space Ç´Ò ¾ µ, where Ò is the number of states. Moreover, it is easy to see that the definition of probabilistic weak bisimulation extends the classical notion of weak bisimulation, i.e. whenever two terms are probabilistic weakly bisimulation equivalent, then their nondeterministic counterparts are weakly bisimulation equivalent. In particular, as we will see in the next section, the security properties defined in our probabilistic setting capture all the information flows that arise by analyzing the nondeterministic behavior of a system via the classical approach.
Example 4.3
Let us consider the two ÊÌËs of Fig. 6 . By employing the probabilistic weak bisimulation È they turn out to be equivalent. To show such a result, let Ê be the equiva- executing an arbitrary number of times the internal action . In order to evaluate the probability Figure 6 . Bisimulation equivalent probabilistic systems
We conclude this section by giving a notion of probabilistic weak bisimulation up to È in the line of [11] , that will be used in the proof of Theorem 5.13 showing that the probabilistic security properties are a conservative extension of the nondeterministic counterparts. In the following definition, given a relation Ê, we denote by Ê ½ the inverse relation of Ê, and by´Êµ · the transitive closure of Ê. 
Security Properties
In this section we present three probabilistic security properties, by extending the non-interference theory described in Sect. 2 to the probabilistic framework of Sect. 3 and 4.
We now introduce an auxiliary operator È which behaves as the hiding operator È 
It is worth noting that the family of well defined processes does not change if we replace parameter ½ ¾ in the operator È by any other value in ℄¼ ½ . Moreover, we observe that if È is well defined then each È ¼ ¾ Ö´Èµ and each É such that È È É are well defined. It is easy to see that all processes originating finite state transition systems and all processes with a finite set of probabilistic weak bisimulation equivalence classes are in Û .
Intuitively, È ¾ Û is such that each event (visible action), which can be observed by executing a given pattern of actions, is executed with a probability greater than a fixed ¼. By taking into consideration the set Û of processes, in the following subsections, we introduce the probabilistic version of the non-interference properties of Sect. 2.2 and, through several examples, we discuss such properties by emphasizing their adequacy to reveal indirect information flows that are not captured by classical properties based on nondeterminism. Afterwards, we show that our probabilistic approach is a conservative extension of the nondeterministic approach to information flow theory described in Sect. 2. In particular, if a system satisfies a probabilistic security property, then it satisfies also the corresponding nondeterministic security property. Finally, we show that by modeling the probabilistic behavior of the system a quantitative estimate of the information flow can be given, in the sense that we can evaluate the probability of observing each (potentially insecure) behavior of the system.
Probabilistic Non-interference
We start our analysis by defining a probabilistic extension of the ËAEAEÁ property, that we call Bisimulation Strong Probabilistic Non-interference ( ËÈAEÁ ). In the following, given È ¾ Û , we denote by À È ÌÝÔ À the set containing the types of the high level actions which syntactically occur in the action prefix operators within È , by È the sequence (in alphabetic order) of the types in À È , and by À È the cardinality of À È . Moreover, we denote by Ë Õ the set of -length sequences with domain . The intuition under such a definition is that a system È is secure if and only if the probability distribution of the events which are observable by a low level user is independent of the behavior of the high level user. In other words, the ËÈAEÁ property extends the condition checked by the ËAEAEÁ property by taking into consideration also the probabilistic information. Note that in term È Ô È , the parameters Ô ½ Ô ÀÈ forming the sequence Ô are used to solve the nondeterminism in È due to the potential interaction of any reactive high level action of È with the external environment. In practice, they model the probabilistic behavior of the high level user that executes generative high level actions which synchronize with the corresponding reactive high level actions of È to form internal actions . One can think that the use of the parameters Ô when hiding the system can be debatable, since it is not clear if the choice of such parameters can affect the result of the analysis. Therefore, we want the ËÈAEÁ property to be satisfied for any choice of such parameters, i.e. system È is to be secure for any probability distribution (chosen by the high level user) of the hidden reactive high level actions. This means that we check if in any way the nondeterministic choices in È are resolved by the high level user the probabilistic behavior of È as observed by a low level user does not change.
We point out that it is easy to verify the property for any choice of parameters Ô ½ Ô ÀÈ , because when we compute weak bisimulation equivalence classes of È Ô È we check if the class partitioning we obtain depends on some of the values Ô . If this is not the case, i.e. if the probability associated with any transition leading from one class to another one does not depend on any parameter Ô , and if È Ô È is equivalent to È Ò ÌÝÔ À , then we have that the high probabilistic behavior does not affect the low view of the system. On the other hand, if some Ô affects the probability of going from one class to another one, then È Ò ÌÝÔ À cannot be equivalent to is not meaningful as we hide generative actions only). We point out that the same example obtained by replacing with £ , i.e. if we consider term È ¼ ¡ Ð È ¼ · £ Ð È ¼ , is still secure, as
This means that any potential interaction of È ¼ with the environment by means of a synchronization via a high level action cannot alter the probability distribution of the event Ð (which is always executed with probability ½) and, as a consequence, the behavior of the system observable by a low level user. Therefore, not depending on how the nondeterministic choice between Ð and £ will be resolved by the high environment, the system remains secure and does not reveal any high information to the low view.
Capturing Probabilistic Information Flows
In this section, we study the kind of insecure behaviors that can be ruled out in the framework of our probabilistic approach. In particular, we show through some example that the ËÈAEÁ property is able to capture unwanted information leakage due to the probabilistic behavior of the system. Fig. 7 ). As we have seen, such a system has no information flow if we only consider the possible behaviors of the system and the ËAEAEÁ property, but the execution of the sequence Ð Ð ¼ (with respect to the execution of a single Ð) will reveal information about when considering statistical inferences derived from the relative frequency of outcomes of repeated executions. In other words, the high level user affects the low view as observed by a low level user that considers the execution frequency of the low events in several runs of the system. Formally, in È Ò ÌÝÔ À a low level user observes either the single event Ð with probability Õ ¡Ô·´½ Õµ or the sequence Ð Ð ¼ with probability Õ ¡´½ Ôµ. On the other hand, in È ÌÝÔ À a low level user observes either the single event Ð with probability Õ ¡Ô or the sequence Ð Ð ¼ with probability ½ Õ ¡ Ô. As a consequence È Ò ÌÝÔ À È È ÌÝÔ À and, therefore, È is not ËÈAEÁ secure. Example 5.5 Let us consider the nondeterministic process: τ, The two examples above show that from a nondeterministic process È Ò which is ËAEAEÁ secure, we can derive a probabilistic process È obtained by adding probabilistic information to the system, such that È is not ËÈAEÁ secure because it reveals a probabilistic covert channel. On the other hand, in the following example we show that the ËÈAEÁ property is more than enough to capture probabilistic covert channels of systems that, without probabilistic information, are classified as secure systems even by the strongest nondeterministic security properties of Sect. 2.2 (like, e.g., the Ë AE ).
Example 5.6
Let us consider the following pseudocode which is inspired to an example proposed by Sabelfeld and Sands in [45, 46] :
Figure 9. Example of a system concealing a probabilistic covert channel
where is a high level variable that has been previously set either to ¼ or to ½ by the high level user (e.g., according to a given probability distribution), and Ö Ò ´Òµ is a function which randomly samples a natural number in the set ¼ Ò . Then, the low level output (i.e. the value of variable Ð) either is directly read by the high level output with probability Ô or is randomly sampled from the possible values ¼ and ½ with probability ½ Ô. The behavior of such a system is graphically represented in Fig. 9 . It is easy to see that the above program has no information flow if we only consider the possible behaviors of the system, but the final value of Ð will reveal if the low user observes the relative frequency of outcomes of repeated executions. Similarly, let us consider the following process:
where a low level user observes either an action Ð ¼ or an action Ð ½ with a probability distribution that depends on the high environment behavior. In particular, if no external communication can be completed via a synchronization with the high action , the system chooses between the two low level actions Ð ¼ and Ð ½ with the same probability ½ ¾ (such a choice models the assignment Ð Ö Ò ´½µ). On the other hand, if the system interacts with the high level user by executing the action , then the probability distribution of the two low level events is guided by parameter Õ (such a component is the counterpart of the assignment Ð ). Intuitively, Õ is the parameter of the probability distribution of the two possible values (¼ and ½) that can assume and transmit to the low part, while Ô is the parameter which guides the probabilistic choice between the two alternative ways of producing a low level output. The nondeterministic version of process È is secure, because the high behavior does not alter the low view of the system, that is represented by a nondeterministic choice between the actions Ð ¼ and Ð ½ . However, in the probabilistic setting this is not the case. Indeed, the probability of observing an action Ð ¼ with respect to an action Ð ½ changes depending on the behavior of the high level user. In particular, from Fig. 10 ). In practice, we have that È is ËÈAEÁ secure if and only if Õ ½ ¾ , because in such a case the high level user simulates the behavior of the function Ö Ò ´½µ used to determine the low output, so that a low level user cannot infer the high behavior by observing the probability distribution of the two low level actions.
It is worth noting that the information flow revealed in Example 5.6 is not captured by any security property defined in [22] . This is because the potential interaction with the high level user in Example 5.6 does not change the possibilistic behavior that is observable by a low level user. In other words, the covert channel of Example 5.6 is merely probabilistic, in that it is revealed by observing the low level probabilistic behavior only. 
Probabilistic Nondeducibility On Composition
Sometimes the non-interference property is not enough to capture all the potential insecure behaviors of a system. For this reason, other properties have been suggested in order to overcome the lacks of such a property. Among the different proposals, here we consider the AE that, in our probabilistic setting, we call Probabilistic AE (È AE , for short). The È AE property is compliant to the notion of probabilistic non-interference given by Gray in [29] . In particular, Gray defines the notions of high environment behavior À and low environment behavior Ä, which give the probability of the external environment producing high (low) inputs given that the previous history of high (low) input and output events has taken place. Then, he checks if, by fixing Ä and by modifying À, the probability distribution of the low level events of the system changes or not depending on the environment behavior described by Ä and À. In our process algebraic framework, the potential interactions of the system with any high level user through the reactive high level (input) actions and the generative high level (output) actions play the role of the high environment behavior which may affect the low view of the system. Therefore, we check if any high level user, represented by process ¥, is able to affect the probabilistic low view of È .
As in the nondeterministic framework, È AE is at least as strong as ËÈAEÁ .
Proposition 5.8 È AE
ËÈAEÁ .
Proof Given È ¾ È AE and À È ½ Ò , we define ÊÀ È ¡ ½£ ÊÀ È ·´ ¾£ ÊÀ È · ·´ Ò ½ £ ÊÀ È · Ò£ ÊÀ È µ µ as the process which repeatedly performs a purely nondeterministic choice among the input high level actions with type in À È (note that in such a process the probabilistic parameters in the alternative choice operators never come into play). By the semantics rules of the probabilistic parallel operator, it is easy to see that È and È Ô ÀÈ ÊÀ È are isomorphic È ¾ Û Ô ¾℄¼ ½ . Due to this and by È AE definition, we have that
Now, we prove that the inclusion is strict by using a probabilistic variant of the system de- The example reported in the proof of Proposition 5.8 shows that the ËÈAEÁ property is not able to detect some potential deadlock due to high level activities, exactly as shown in [21] in the nondeterministic case. Similarly, the next example reveals that the È AE is more adequate than the ËÈAEÁ to capture probabilistic covert channels.
Example 5.10 Let us consider the process:
whose corresponding ÊÌË is shown in Fig. 11´ µ. It is provable that È ¾ ËÈAEÁ . Indeed, we have that
Intuitively, it is easy to see that if a low level user observes the action Ð, then he knows that the high level action ½ has not taken place. More precisely, to show the potential covert channel which may be set up from high level to low level, we observe that a high level user may´ µ prevent the execution of action ¾ of the component ¾ Ð ¼,´ µ wait for the probabilistic choice between the two internal actions , and then´ µ if the first component Ð ¼ · Ô ½ ¼ is chosen with probability ½ Ô, he can affect the low view of the system by communicating (or not) the action ½ . We can prove that this insecure behavior is captured by the È AE property. To this end, consider the process ¥ ¡ ½£ ¼ and the synchronization set Ë ½ ¾ . The ÊÌË derived from´´È Ë ¥µ ËµÒ ÌÝÔ À is depicted in Fig. 11´ µ. In particular, the behavior of such a composed system consists of a probabilistic choice between the action Ð, performed with probability Ô, and the internal action , performed with probability ½ Ô. The ÊÌË derived from È ÌÝÔ À is that of Fig. 11´µ , which is clearly not equivalent to that of Fig. 11´ µ. Therefore,´È Ë ¥µ ËµÒ ÌÝÔ À È È ÌÝÔ À and, as a consequence, È is not È AE secure. Finally, it is worth noting that, similarly as reported in [21, 23] , the above definition of È AE is difficult to use because of the universal quantification on high level processes. For this reason, in the following section we propose the probabilistic version of the Ë AE property that solves Figure 11 . Example of a system that is ËÈAEÁ secure but not È AE secure such a problem.
Strong Probabilistic AE
In this section, we introduce a probabilistic security property stronger than the È AE , which extends to the probabilistic setting the Ë AE of Sect. 2.2.
Example 5.11
The process È ¡ ´ Ð ½ ¼ · Ô Ð ¾ ¼µ · Ô ´ Ð ½ ¼ · Ô Ð ¾ ¼µ probabilistically evolves either into a state which performs action Ð ½ with probability ½ or into a state which performs action Ð ¾ with probability ½. The corresponding ÊÌË is shown in Fig. 12 . Such a system is ËÈAEÁ secure, because
Moreover, it is provable that È is È AE secure too. As a sketch of such a proof, we observe that any composed terḿ´È Õ Ë ¥µ ËµÒ ÌÝÔ À is weakly probabilistic bisimulation equivalent to: È ÌÝÔ À in the case ¾ Ë and ¥ enables , È Ò ÌÝÔ À otherwise.
Should we consider È as a secure system? Intuitively, if we assume that the high level user is allowed to know whether from the initial state È the system evolves either into È ½ or into È ¾ (see Fig. 12 ), then the system is certainly insecure. Indeed, the relative frequency of the low level action Ð ½ (Ð ¾ ) as observed in a repeated execution of system È in isolation is Ô (½ Ô), but such a probability distribution can be easily altered by a high level user who, aware of how the internal probabilistic choice in term È is resolved, can decide to block (to communicate) the action .
Such a behavior is not captured by the È AE , therefore we need a stronger notion of security, and to this end we introduce the strong version of the È AE . However, we point out that the assumption above on the knowledge of the high level user which is necessary to set up the insecure information flow is, in our view, rather questionable. Figure 12 . Example of a covert channel in a system that is È AE secure Now, we define the probabilistic version of the Ë AE that we call Strong È AE (ËÈ AE ).
Such a definition completes the probabilistic extension of the nondeterministic approach pre-
In general, by following a basic intuition similar to that given for Å s [29] , an interpretation of the ËÈ AE property is that in each system state the probability of the low events is independent of the previous high events. Indeed, supposed that the probability distribution of a low event Ð in a given state of a system È depends on a high action previously executed, we should also have that there exist È ¼ and È ¼¼ , reachable from È , such that È ¼ È ¼¼ and the probability distribution of Ð in È ¼ is not equal to the probability distribution of Ð in È ¼¼ , thus violating the ËÈ AE property. Therefore, the strong condition verified by the ËÈ AE is that in any state of the system the low level user cannot make inferences about high information previously communicated by (to) the high level user. The several examples we reported in the previous sections suggest that, if we are interested in guaranteeing that what the low part can see is independent of what the high part can do, then the È AE is the appropriate definition with respect to protection against probabilistic covert channels. On the other hand, the ËÈ AE is easier to be verified than the È AE and, as we can see in the following Theorem 5.13, is also stronger than the È AE . Hence, it can be used as a verification condition for È AE . The technical machinery needed to stem the proof is presented in the appendix. Here, we just
give an intuition of the reason why the inclusion above holds. If a system È is ËÈ AE , then È ¼ È ¼¼ , with È ¼ and È ¼¼ derivatives of È and Ø´ µ ¾ ÌÝÔ À , implies that È ¼ Ò ÌÝÔ À and È ¼¼ Ò ÌÝÔ À are weakly bisimulation equivalent. Therefore, the probability distribution of the high level actions executable by È ¼ ¾ Ö´Èµ does not affect the probability distribution of the low view of the system, or, equivalently, any high level process interacting with È ¼ cannot alter the probability distribution of the low level actions as observed by a low level user. À , Ô ¾℄¼ ½ , and Õ ¾ Ë Õ ℄¼ ½ , therefore È ¼ ¾ Ö´Èµ È ¼ is È AE (and also ËÈAEÁ ), which is a condition stricter than that we wanted to prove.
Conservative Extension and Comparison
In this section we show that the security properties defined in our probabilistic framework are the natural, conservative extension of the logical security properties based on the nondeterministic setting described in Sect. 2. Intuitively, the integration of probabilities as a further aspect of the system to be modeled adds new information that extends what is already known in the nondeterministic case. In the previous sections, we have shown through several examples that if the nondeterministic model È Ò of a system satisfies a security property, say ËÈ Ò , then its probabilistic version È , obtained by modeling also the probabilistic behavior of the system, may not satisfy the security property ËÈ, which is the probabilistic counterpart of ËÈ Ò . Now, we want to show that given an arbitrary security property ËÈ which has to be checked for a term È of our probabilistic calculus, whenever È satisfies ËÈ then È Ò satisfies ËÈ Ò . In order to prove such a relationship, we now show what happens, from the security property viewpoint, when passing from the probabilistic framework to the nondeterministic one.
The following lemma shows that, given two terms È É ¾ which are weakly probabilistic bisimulation equivalent, then the two terms È Ò É Ò ¾ Ò obtained from È and É by removing the probabilities from the algebraic operators are weakly bisimulation equivalent.
Lemma 5.14 Given
since È È É it follows ÈÖÓ ´È £ µ ÈÖÓ ´É £ µ for all ¾ Ø. In the following theorem, we assume ËÈ ¾ ËÈAEÁ È AE ËÈ AE , and we denote by ËÈ Ò the nondeterministic counterpart of the property ËÈ, i.e. ËÈ Ò ¾ ËAEAEÁ AE Ë AE . We can argue similarly for the È AE and the ËÈ AE to stem the complete proof.
By Proposition 5.8 and Theorem 5.13 it follows that the probabilistic extension of the security properties preserves the same inclusion relationships seen in the nondeterministic case in Proposition 2.10. Further potential relations among nondeterministic and probabilistic security properties are discussed through some example. The example above shows that the ËÈAEÁ property is not stricter than the Ë AE property, i.e. even if a system È Ò is not Ë AE secure, its probabilistic extension È may be ËÈAEÁ secure. seen in Example 2.5, the AE property. Therefore, the ËÈAEÁ property is not stricter than the AE property too. In addition, in Example 5.11 we have presented a system È which is È AE secure, but not ËÈ AE secure. As it is easy to verify, its nondeterministic counterpart È Ò is AE secure, but not Ë AE secure. Hence, the È AE property is not stricter than the Ë AE property. This concludes the discussion on the inclusion relationships among security properties. In Fig. 13 we graphically report the comparison among the nondeterministic setting and the probabilistic one. The figure shows, e.g., that if a process È ¾ Û is ËÈAEÁ secure, then its nondeterministic version È Ò ¾ Ò may be not AE secure, since the ËÈAEÁ labeled graph is not included in the AE labeled graph.
We just want to point out the following remark. In the nondeterministic case the strong version of the AE property turns out to be important to reveal potential behaviors which are clearly insecure (see, e.g., Examples 2.8 and 2.9). On the other hand, in our view in the probabilistic case it is not easy to find a realistic example showing that the ËÈ AE is stronger than the È AE , which seems to be the adequate notion of security in most cases. For instance, Example 5.11 assumes a very strong knowledge of the high level user, who should be able to see the result of an internal probabilistic choice within the system to set up a covert channel which is captured by the ËÈ AE , but not by the È AE . 
Relation between Security Analysis and Probabilistic Information
By modeling the probabilistic behavior of systems, new aspects of the potential information flows from high level to low level can be analyzed. In particular, while in a nondeterministic, qualitative view we can just deduce that a system is (is not) secure, in the probabilistic setting we can add that the system reveals an insecure information flow with a certain probability. To this end, answers to questions like "What is the probability that an information flow from high level to low level has taken place?" cannot be provided if the verification of the security properties only depends on classical behavioral equivalences like the probabilistic bisimulation considered in Sect. 4.
Based on the considerations above, we need a quantitative notion of behavioral equivalence for deciding if two probabilistic processes behave almost (up to small fluctuations) the same or, more formally, for measuring the distance between probabilistic transition systems. In particular, the notion of equivalence can be enriched in order to tolerate fluctuations that make the security condition less restrictive. As an example, in [12, 15] different pseudometrics are proposed that quantify the similarity of the behavior of probabilistic transition systems which are not bisimilar, and that can be easily exploited also in this context. In particular, in [15] the authors consider a metric on partial labeled Markov chains that are a generalization of our fully specified ÊÌËs (i.e. purely generative systems) in that for each state the sum of the probabilities of the outgoing transitions, if there are any, is less than (or equal to) ½, while in the case of purely generative
ÊÌËs such a sum sums up to ½. Now, we define a probabilistic weak bisimulation with -precision that takes into consideration small fluctuations for equivalent processes. property. In order words, the probabilistic information given in È is not responsible for making the system insecure. On the other hand, in our probabilistic setting we could add that system È is secure with probability ½ Ô and reveals an information flow with probability Ô. In the case Ô is a value close to ¼, the low level user is able to infer the high level user behavior, by observing the low view of the system, with a probability which is negligible, so that È could be considered as a good approximation of a secure system. Formally, we have that
Hence, the system can be considered secure enough as Ô tends to the value ¼. 
As we have seen, È is not ËÈAEÁ secure. Now, let us denote by ½ ¼℄ È the equivalence class of term null and by ¾ Ð ¼ ¼℄ È the equivalence class of term Ð ¼ ¼. On the one hand, we have ÈÖÓ ´ÈÒ ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ½ µ Õ ¡ Ô · ½ Õ and ÈÖÓ ´ÈÒ ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ¾ µ Õ ¡´½ Ôµ. On the other hand, we have ÈÖÓ ´È ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ½ µ Õ ¡ Ô and ÈÖÓ ´È ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ¾ µ ½ Õ ¡ Ô. Therefore, ÈÖÓ ´ÈÒ ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ½ µ ÈÖÓ ´È ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ½ µ ½ Õ ÈÖÓ ´ÈÒ ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ¾ µ ÈÖÓ ´È ÌÝÔ À £ Ð ¾ µ , from which we derive È Ò ÌÝÔ À È È ÌÝÔ À if Õ ½ . Intuitively, if Õ is close to ½ then the insecure behavior in È is enabled with a negligible probability, i.e. the low view of È , with or without the interaction with the high level user, changes according to a small -fluctuation. This means that by observing the overcome of repeated executions of the system, a low level user should not notice the behavior of the high level user.
Our probabilistic approach can be used to verify the security level of systems for which probabilities play an important role. For instance, many problems can be solved by using deterministic algorithms which turn out to be secure and require exponential time. On the other hand, probabilistic algorithms are often implemented that solve the same problems in polynomial time (see, e.g., [13, 36] ). In such a case, the price to pay for a computational gain is the possibility for the observer of detecting an undesirable information flow. Because of such a possibility, by following an approach to information flow theory based on pure nondeterminism, the probabilistic algorithms turn out to be insecure. Instead, by employing our probabilistic approach, we can formally prove that the same algorithms have an insecure behavior which is executed with probability ¼ (or close to ¼). Hence, a formal quantitative estimate of the unwanted behaviors is decisive to evaluate the security level of probabilistic systems. The need for replacing the notion of indistinguishability between processes by a notion of similarity has been emphasized also in [16, 17] in the context of a probabilistic declarative language called È È. In particular, with respect to our approach based on a notion of -bisimulation, in [16, 17] similarity among È È processes is checked by observing the behavior of the processes in all contexts, and by looking at how much the observed behaviors differ.
To conclude this section, we want to point out that dealing with probabilistic processes has also the advantage that, in the absence of nondeterminism, performance measures of systems can be easily evaluated. Indeed, when the system is closed and the derived ÊÌË is fully generative, we can stem a Markov Chain by simply removing the actions from the labels of the transitions.
Example 5.20
Let us consider the system È described in Example 5.6. The probability distribution of the low level events Ð ¼ and Ð ½ depends on the behavior of the high level user. If we are interested in evaluating the security conditions of È we can verify that, e.g., È is not ËÈAEÁ secure. On the other hand, if we are interested in evaluating performance measures of È , we can derive a Markov Chain from the ÊÌË underlying È based on which we can compute, e.g., the probability of executing a high level event with respect to a low level event (Ð ¼ or Ð ½ ) via standard techniques (see, e.g., [33] ). Therefore, by analyzing the same system model, we can derive both information flow security properties and performance related measures.
A Case Study: Probabilistic Routing
In this section we present a case study showing that our approach can be exploited to analyze the information flow in real systems. In particular, we consider a routing mechanism of the OSI network layer [50] , and we model an internetworking node, termed Interface Message Processor (IMP, for short), that is responsible for deciding, at the network layer, on which output link an arriving packet should be sent, depending on the destination of that packet. Such a case study has been proposed in [9] to emphasize the expressive power of our probabilistic process algebra. More precisely, the multi-path routing algorithm modeled in [9] supports both handling of packets destined to several possible destinations and multiple paths to the same destination. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a smooth simplification of the same case study with two possible destinations (one is considered to be a high level link and one is considered to be a low level link) and a single path for each of them, and we show how to analyze all the potential information flows that may occur.
Algebraic Specification of the IMP
The algebraic specification of the IMP is presented in Table 4 in the case of two possible destinations, and , where is dedicated to the transmission of public data (the actions handling packets destined to represent the low level view of the system), while is reserved to the transmission of confidential data (the actions handling packets destined to represent the high level view of the system). Therefore the actions related to packets destined to (Ö Ú , Û Ø , ÔØ , × Ò , Ù×Ý , ØÖ Ò×Ñ , and Ú Ð ) are low level actions, while all the other actions, related to packets destined to , are high level actions.
The system ÁÅÈ consists of the parallel composition of three components: a term ÖÖ Ú Ð× modeling the incoming traffic, a term ÊÓÙØ Ö modeling the core of the IMP, and a term ÒÒ Ð× modeling the outgoing channels. The parameters which probabilistically guide the choice of the component to be executed are Ô ½ and Ô ¾ , i.e. in each system state the term executing the next move is ÖÖ Ú Ð× with probability Ô ½ , ÊÓÙØ Ö with probability Ô ¾ ¡´½ Ô ½ µ, and ÒÒ Ð× with probability´½ Ô ¾ µ ¡´½ Ô ½ µ. Now let us describe in detail the behavior of each component of the system.
Term ÖÖ Ú Ð× is composed of two processes ÖÖ Ú Ð and ÖÖ Ú Ð , that model the incoming traffic directed to destinations and , respectively. In case of process ÖÖ Ú Ð (we can argue similarly for process ÖÖ Ú Ð ), the parameter Ö expresses the probability of observing the arrival of a packet destined to . Such an event is modeled by the action Ö Ú that synchronizes with the corresponding reactive action in the queue for packets of term ÊÓÙØ Ö. In the case such a queue is full the action Ö Ú is not enabled and the arriving packets are lost with probability ½ through the execution of the generative action Û Ø .
Term ÊÓÙØ Ö, which is the core of the IMP, manages the packets directed to the two destinations via a probabilistic scheduler. In particular, term ÊÓÙØ Ö is composed of a term ÉÙ Ù × collecting the arriving packets, a term ËÛ Ø delivering the packets to the outgoing channels, and a term Á Ð modeling the phases of router inactivity. They are defined as follows. Term ÉÙ Ù × consists of two terms, one for each kind of packet, that behave reactively. They receive packets destined to ( ) through reactive actions of type Ö Ú (Ö Ú ) and pass them to the ËÛ Ø term through reactive actions of type ÔØ ( ÔØ ). For the sake of simplicity, we assume both queues to be of size ½. Term ËÛ Ø executes two different terms, each one managing packets with a certain destination ( or ) via a probabilistic scheduler with parameter Ô. The term delivering packets to destination is composed of a term Å Ò Ö and a term ÊÓÙØ Ò (similarly for the term delivering packets destined to ). Term Å Ò Ö accepts packets destined to from the dedicated queue through action ÔØ and afterwards either immediately passes them to the ÊÓÙØ Ò term through action × Ò , or waits until the channel is available for transmission by performing action Ù×Ý . The ÊÓÙØ Ò term, which behaves reactively, accepts packets through a reactive action of type × Ò and transmits them through the corresponding channel via a reactive action of type ØÖ Ò×Ñ . Whenever the ÊÓÙØ Ò term is busy, the transmission of packets destined to is not possible and this is signalled to the Å Ò Ö term through a synchronization by enabling the reactive action of type Ù×Ý . Term Á Ð executes an action Ð , expressing the inactivity periods of the IMP, whenever term ÊÓÙØ Ö has nothing else to do. More precisely, action Ð is executed through a multiway synchronization with all the other ÊÓÙØ Ö components if and only if the input queues (term ÉÙ Ù ×) are empty and the core of the IMP (term ËÛ Ø ) is not waiting for delivering a packet to the channel. It is worth noting that in our model the action Ð is considered to be a high level action. The motivation for this will be considered when analyzing the security properties of the router. Term ÒÒ Ð× is composed of two processes modeling the possible channels and . The process dedicated to destination ( ) can either transmit a packet when the generative action ØÖ Ò×Ñ (ØÖ Ò×Ñ ) synchronizes with the corresponding reactive action of term ÊÓÙØ Ò (ÊÓÙØ Ò ) managing that channel, or be available for transmission when the generative action Ú Ð ( Ú Ð ) is synchronized with the corresponding reactive action of term ÊÓÙØ Ò (ÊÓÙØ Ò ). we are ready to analyze the potential information flow of the IMP model. The system described in Sect. 6.1 turns out to be secure, because no interaction is allowed among the high level and the low level components of the router. Formally, it is easy to see that the system ÁÅÈ satisfies the ËÈ AE property. Intuitively, we observe that a low level packet destined to is received via a low level ingoing channel (term ÖÖ Ú Ð ), handled by the low level components of the core of the IMP (term ÊÓÙØ Ö), and sent on a low level channel. All the high level components of the router are not involved in (and cannot affect) the execution of the steps of such a pipeline. The same happens when a high level packet passes through the router, in that no low level component is affected by the execution of the actions handling such a packet. The only difference between the high level user and the low level one is that the high level part of the router is allowed to know (via the execution of the action Ð ) the idleness periods of the router. On the other hand, if we make such a situation observable by the low level part (e.g. by turning Ð into a low level action), then a low level user can deduce the inactivity phases of the high level components by observing each occurrence of the action Ð . This means that in such a case a low level user knows if the IMP does not currently contain high level packets. This undesirable functional behavior would be easily captured by the AE in the nondeterministic case and by the È AE in our probabilistic setting. Now, let us consider the effect on the system behavior of some modification that introduces potential interactions between the low level and high level components. In a first variant of the router, we allow the high level packets (those destined to ) to be transmitted over the low level channel destined to . This means that the router sends on a public channel the data received from a confidential channel. This scenario can be described by changing term ÊÓÙØ Ò ¼ , which models the passage of a packet over the channel destined to , into the following one:
ÊÓÙØ Ò ¼ ¡ ´ØÖ Ò×Ñ £ ÊÓÙØ Ò · ØÖ Ò×Ñ £ ÊÓÙØ Ò µ · Ù×Ý £ ÊÓÙØ Ò ¼ By enabling both actions ØÖ Ò×Ñ £ and ØÖ Ò×Ñ £ in term ÊÓÙØ Ò ¼ , we obtain the effect that each high level packet can be passed either to the low level channel or to the high level channel, and such a choice is probabilistically guided by parameter Ú which models the probabilistic parallel execution of the two processes ÒÒ Ð and ÒÒ Ð that execute the synchronizing generative actions ØÖ Ò×Ñ and ØÖ Ò×Ñ , respectively. Whenever high level packets pass through the router, a low level user observes more packets sent over the low level outgoing channel than packets arrived at the ingoing low level channel. Contrariwise, whenever the high level part does not interact with the system, a low level user observes a transmission over the outgoing low level channel for each ingoing low level packet. More formally, this direct information flow is captured by the ËÈAEÁ in the probabilistic framework and by the ËAEAEÁ in the nondeterministic setting. Now, we propose an example showing an indirect information flow that is captured by the ËÈAEÁ and is not revealed in the nondeterministic case. Let us assume that a malfunctioning in the input ports of the router is responsible for loosing some arriving low level packets each time a high level packet is handled by the related input queue. We can model such a behavior by altering the parameter Ö that models the incoming low level traffic. To this aim, we change the In particular, the generative action Ö Ú of process ÖÖ Ú Ð synchronizes with the corresponding reactive action of process ÖÖ Ú Ð . The effect of such a synchronization in process ÖÖ Ú Ð is that the probability distribution of the low level actions Ö Ú and Û Ø is altered, since it is guided by parameter Ö ¼ instead of parameter Ö . If, e.g., Ö ¼ Ö , then the probability of observing the arrival of a low level packet decreases because of the arrival of a high level packet.
In the nondeterministic setting, this indirect information flow is not captured by the Ë AE , which is the strongest security property for nondeterministic processes considered in this paper. Intuitively, this is because the set of possible behaviors of the low level part is not affected by the high level components. On the other hand, it is easy to see that in the probabilistic setting such an insecure behavior is revealed by the ËÈAEÁ , since the probability distribution of the two low level actions Ö Ú and Û Ø is affected by the behavior of the high level components. Hence, the information flow described above is purely probabilistic (similarly as seen in Example 5.6) in the sense that no security property for nondeterministic processes can reveal it by analyzing the possibilistic behavior of the system.
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the problem of extending the non-interference theory of [20, 21] to the probabilistic case. The motivation under this extension is that from the security viewpoint the analysis of the probabilistic behavior of systems can contribute to reveal those covert channels that are solely probabilistic and, therefore, not observable in a purely nondeterministic setting.
For instance, the probabilistic version of the ËAEAEÁ property turns out to be able to capture information flows that would not be caught by the strongest classical non-probabilistic notions of non-interference considered in this paper (e.g. the Ë AE , which is the most restrictive property proposed in [20] , and, equivalently, the ËÄAEÁ [26] ). We have shown that the security properties we have proposed in our probabilistic setting represent a conservative extension of the classical nondeterministic definitions of non-interference, in that a system which is secure when modeling its probabilistic behavior is still secure when considering its possibilistic behavior only. Moreover, all the results known in the nondeterministic setting, in particular the inclusion relationships among the security properties, hold when scaling to the probabilistic framework. We have emphasized that by considering the probabilistic aspect of the behavior of a system, a quantitative estimate of the information flow can be given, allowing us to overcome the classical, qualitative view based on which confidential information is (is not) leaked to the low level part. This is an important aspect we intend to examine thoroughly by analyzing suitable case studies. To this end, we aim at exploiting such an approach in the area of network security for the analysis of cryptographic protocol properties (e.g. by extending the results obtained in the nondeterministic case in [18] ). In particular, we aim at formally proving the security level of some probabilistic algorithm employed in cryptographic protocols to achieve polynomial time complexity (see, e.g., [13] ). Along this line, we have proposed the security analysis of a probabilistic non-repudiation protocol [36] in [3] . Finally, it could be interesting to employ in our setting the general approach of [24] , where non-interference properties like the AE are used to analyze different requirements of communication protocols, like secrecy, authenticity, and non-repudiation.
where Á Ò (Á Ò ) denotes the set of terms reachable from Ê Ò by executing an action ( ), while Ô Ò Ñ (Ô Ò Ñ ) is the probability of reaching Ê Ñ from Ê Ò by executing an action ( ). Moreover, Ô Ò Ñ Ô Ò Ñ · Ô Ò Ñ denotes the overall probability of reaching Ê Ñ from Ê Ò by executing any internal action. Then, defined Ë Õ the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers and denoted with × the th element of the sequence × ¾ Ë Õ, we define the following three sets of sequences of indexes Ñ of terms Ê Ñ : 
It is easy to see that each solution of equation (2) is also a solution of equation (1) .
Indeed, if in equation (1) we replace variables by ¼ solving equation (2) we obtain an identity. Moreover, since in addition we have that Ð Ô is a solution of transformation (2), Ð Ô is also the least fix point of transformation (2).
moreover, since by ËÈ AE hypothesis we have that × ¾ Ë Ò
